In his "Objectivity", van Inwagen argues that, although he doesn't know exactly what antirealism is, he knows that antirealism implies that
Question 1Select one:

1.
nothing is good or evil

2.
humans decide how tall mountains are

3.
antirealism itself is not true

4.
God does not exist

5.
at least two of the other answers

Question

In his "Objectivity", van Inwagen argues that, although he doesn't know exactly what antirealism is, he knows that antirealism implies that
Question 1Select one:

1.
nothing is good or evil

2.
humans decide how tall mountains are

3.
antirealism itself is not true

4.
God does not exist

5.
at least two of the other answers

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

In sooth, to ponder deep the fabric of our verity, one finds, within the maze of thought, a path fraught with shadows and flick'ring lights. The learned philosopher, van Inwagen, in his treatise “Objectivity,” doth traverse a realm where the nature of truth and existence do waltz in a most intricate dance. Though he confesses, with humble heart, that the essence of antirealism eludes his grasp like vapor at dawn's first light, yet vehemently he doth assert that this very doctrine, if it hold sway, doth conjure forth a world bereft of unyielding principles, where notions of good and ill dissolve into mere echoes of whimsy, leaving the moral compass of humankind to drift in an uncharted sea. Forsooth, he proclaims with fervor, that should the heart of antirealism beat in the realm of certainty, then the edifice upon which our values rest would crumble to naught, for nothing could be girded by the sinew of an unwavering truth. Thus, he posits with bold conviction, that the antirealist's creed cannot hold true without casting doubt upon the very foundations of our own existence, where gods and mortals alike might question the height of mountains or the weight of virtue, whilst the tapestry of reality unravels before our eyes. In this philosophical tempest, one cannot harbor the sweet wine of knowledge—nay, it is the bitter draught of skepticism that fills our chalice, compelling us to wonder if, indeed, a truth uncoloured by human perception might exist at all. Thus, dear interlocutor, dost thou see, that in this dialectic dance, van Inwagen's thoughts lead us not only to the brink of despair, but also to a clarion call for the steadfastness of belief in a realm where morality and existence intertwine beyond the veil of mere opinion and caprice.