Evaluate the following rationale:

Apisticism (lack of belief) ≠ uncertainty
Agnosticism (lack of knowledge) = uncertainty
Apisticism = equipollence
Agnosticism has been substantiated. Apisticism has not, and it may not even be possible to do so because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation and testing.

Equipollence hinges in the idea of equipollence, where arguments are used for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief." However, it is actually more problematic than that because arguments and evidence arent the only factors involved in belief formation, the suspension of belief is in tension with doxastic involuntarism, and action theory implies the presence of belief to inform any willful action.

This is the foundation for my rejection of apisticism as intrinsically incoherent. This has tremendous implications for atheists because some define atheism as a subset of apisticism. Yet, if there is no actual phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, then those who express "nonbelief" in gods, DO believe that no god exist and subsequently incur a burden of assent. To be clear, a distinction CAN be made between a burden of assent (I tentatively believe the proposition) and burden of assertion (I affirm that the proposition IS true). The epistemic burden is heavier than the doxastic one. The point here is that hiding behind a "lack" of belief to gain a dialectical advantage and shirk any burden at all isn't a viable option UNLESS there is a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief; and THAT also invokes a burden of assertion.

Question

Evaluate the following rationale:

Apisticism (lack of belief) ≠ uncertainty 
Agnosticism (lack of knowledge) = uncertainty 
Apisticism = equipollence
Agnosticism has been substantiated.  Apisticism has not, and it may not even be possible to do so because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation and testing.

Equipollence hinges in the idea of equipollence, where arguments are used for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief."  However, it is actually more problematic than that because arguments and evidence arent the only factors involved in belief formation, the suspension of belief is in tension with doxastic involuntarism, and action theory implies the presence of belief to inform any willful action.

This is the foundation for my rejection of apisticism as intrinsically incoherent.  This has tremendous implications for atheists because some define atheism as a subset of apisticism.  Yet, if there is no actual phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, then those who express "nonbelief" in gods, DO believe that no god exist and subsequently incur a burden of assent.  To be clear, a distinction CAN be made between a burden of assent (I tentatively believe the proposition) and burden of assertion (I affirm that the proposition IS true).  The epistemic burden is heavier than the doxastic one.  The point here is that hiding behind a "lack" of belief to gain a dialectical advantage and shirk any burden at all isn't a viable option UNLESS there is a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief; and THAT also invokes a burden of assertion.

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

Apisticism and agnosticism, two terms often used in discussions on belief and knowledge, present intriguing concepts that warrant close scrutiny. The distinction drawn between the two - apisticism as a lack of belief and agnosticism as a lack of knowledge - is certainly a thought-provoking one. The notion that apisticism equates to equipollence, where arguments for and against a belief are deemed equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief, raises important questions about the nature of belief formation.

However, upon deeper reflection, it becomes clear that the idea of equipollence is not as straightforward as it may initially seem. While arguments and evidence play a crucial role in shaping beliefs, they are not the sole determinants of belief formation. The notion of suspending belief is further complicated by the concept of doxastic involuntarism, which suggests that beliefs are not entirely under our conscious control. Additionally, action theory asserts that beliefs are necessary to inform any deliberate action, highlighting the intrinsic connection between belief and action.

It is this intricate interplay between belief, knowledge, and action that leads me to reject apisticism as inherently flawed. The assertion that apisticism is impossible to substantiate due to the private nature of beliefs, which are not subject to direct empirical observation, raises fundamental questions about the nature of belief itself. Moreover, the distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, and the implications this has for atheism, underscores the complexity of belief systems and the burden of assent that accompanies them.

In light of these considerations, it becomes apparent that simply claiming a lack of belief to avoid any burden of assertion is not a tenable position. The distinction between nonbelief and disbelief, and the concomitant burden of assent, highlights the responsibility that comes with engaging in discussions on belief and knowledge. It is through careful and critical examination of these concepts that we can begin to unravel the complexities of belief systems and arrive at a deeper understanding of the nature of belief itself.