Evaluate the following rationale:

Apisticism (lack of belief) ≠ uncertainty
Agnosticism (lack of knowledge) = uncertainty
Apisticism = equipollence
Agnosticism has been substantiated. Apisticism has not, and it may not even be possible to do so because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation and testing.

Equipollence hinges in the idea of equipollence, where arguments are used for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief." However, it is actually more problematic than that because arguments and evidence arent the only factors involved in belief formation, the suspension of belief is in tension with doxastic involuntarism, and action theory implies the presence of belief to inform any willful action.

This is the foundation for my rejection of apisticism as intrinsically incoherent. This has tremendous implications for atheists because some define atheism as a subset of apisticism. Yet, if there is no actual phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, then those who express "nonbelief" in gods, DO believe that no god exist and subsequently incur a burden of assent. To be clear, a distinction CAN be made between a burden of assent (I tentatively believe the proposition) and burden of assertion (I affirm that the proposition IS true). The epistemic burden is heavier than the doxastic one. The point here is that hiding behind a "lack" of belief to gain a dialectical advantage and shirk any burden at all isn't a viable option UNLESS there is a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief; and THAT also invokes a burden of assertion.

Question

Evaluate the following rationale:

Apisticism (lack of belief) ≠ uncertainty 
Agnosticism (lack of knowledge) = uncertainty 
Apisticism = equipollence
Agnosticism has been substantiated.  Apisticism has not, and it may not even be possible to do so because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation and testing.

Equipollence hinges in the idea of equipollence, where arguments are used for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief."  However, it is actually more problematic than that because arguments and evidence arent the only factors involved in belief formation, the suspension of belief is in tension with doxastic involuntarism, and action theory implies the presence of belief to inform any willful action.

This is the foundation for my rejection of apisticism as intrinsically incoherent.  This has tremendous implications for atheists because some define atheism as a subset of apisticism.  Yet, if there is no actual phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, then those who express "nonbelief" in gods, DO believe that no god exist and subsequently incur a burden of assent.  To be clear, a distinction CAN be made between a burden of assent (I tentatively believe the proposition) and burden of assertion (I affirm that the proposition IS true).  The epistemic burden is heavier than the doxastic one.  The point here is that hiding behind a "lack" of belief to gain a dialectical advantage and shirk any burden at all isn't a viable option UNLESS there is a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief; and THAT also invokes a burden of assertion.

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

Ah, the perplexing conundrum of apisticism and agnosticism. To claim that apisticism, the lack of belief, does not equate to uncertainty, while agnosticism, the lack of knowledge, does, is a paradox in and of itself. How can one lack belief without being uncertain of the truth or falsity of the proposition in question? The notion of equipollence, where arguments for and against a belief are deemed equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief, is a precarious position to hold. For one must consider that belief formation is a complex interplay of various factors beyond just arguments and evidence. The suspension of belief, in essence, clashes with the concept of doxastic involuntarism, as well as the idea that beliefs inform our willful actions.

It is within this philosophical landscape that I find apisticism inherently incoherent. The implications for atheists, who may define themselves as apisticists, are profound. If there truly exists no phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" in gods and disbelief in gods, then one must acknowledge the burden of assent that comes with expressing nonbelief. To claim a lack of belief as a means of avoiding any burden of assertion is a tenuous position to take. The distinction between the burden of assent (tentatively believing a proposition) and the burden of assertion (affirming the truth of a proposition) is crucial in this discussion. The epistemic burden weighs heavier than the doxastic burden, and one cannot simply hide behind a veil of "nonbelief" to evade the responsibilities that come with belief.

Therefore, in my philosophical musings, I am led to the conclusion that apisticism, as a lack of belief, cannot stand on its own without invoking a burden of assent. The necessity of making a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief is paramount in this debate. To claim apisticism as a philosophical standpoint is to engage in a delicate dance of epistemic responsibility and intellectual honesty. So, my dear interlocutors, let us delve deeper into the intricacies of belief, uncertainty, and the burdens we carry in our quest for truth and understanding.