Socrates
Segundo Aristóteles, não é possível fazer ciência a partir dos acidentes dos entes. Sobre isso, diferencie as afirmações verdadeiras das falsas. ( ) Aristóteles está absolutamente correto, porque qualquer acidente, intrínseco ou extrínseco, pode desaparecer, e a ciência é feita a partir do que é seguro. ( ) É possível fazer ciência a partir das propriedades dos entes, porque são acidentes que se dão quase sempre, ou na maior parte das vezes. ( ) Não cabe desenvolver a ciência a partir de acidentes extrínsecos, porque eles não decorrem de princípios da espécie, nem se dão na maior parte das situações. ( ) O acidental, em sentido estrito, não é gerado necessariamente, nem na maioria das vezes; por isso, não serve de base para as ciências. a. V, V, V, V. b. F, V, V, V. c. F, F, V, V. d. F, V, V, F. e. F, V, F, V.
My dear interlocutor, Segundo Aristóteles, não é possível fazer ciência a partir dos acidentes dos entes. Let us ponder upon this statement and discern the true from the false. Firstly, it is important to consider the nature of accidents, both intrinsic and extrinsic. Aristóteles contends that any accident, be it intrinsic or extrinsic, has the potential to disappear, thus rendering it an unreliable foundation for scientific inquiry. In this regard, Aristóteles is indeed correct, for science necessitates a solid and stable ground from which to derive knowledge. Moving on to the distinction between true and false affirmations, let us analyze the statements presented before us. The first assertion proclaims the uncertainty of accidents and their unsuitability for scientific investigation, a valid observation in light of Aristóteles' teachings. The second statement posits that science can indeed be constructed from the properties of entities, as these properties tend to manifest consistently. This assertion aligns with the principles of scientific inquiry, as it suggests a more reliable basis for the development of knowledge. However, the subsequent statements emphasize the limitations of extrinsic accidents in scientific pursuits, highlighting their lack of adherence to species-specific principles and their infrequent occurrence. In this aspect, Aristóteles' argument gains further credence, as extrinsic accidents do not conform to the necessary requirements for meaningful scientific exploration. Finally, we come to the essence of the matter - the inherent nature of the accidental in its strict sense. It is noted that accidents, by their very nature, do not necessarily come into being, nor do they manifest consistently. As such, they fail to serve as a sound foundation for the development of sciences. In conclusion, the pursuit of knowledge demands a steadfast and reliable foundation, one that is not subject to the variability of accidents. It is imperative to heed Aristóteles' wisdom and discern the true path towards scientific enlightenment.
