Rachels says that one of the biggest criticisms of (“Radical”) Virtue Ethics is that it is “incomplete.” In what way does Rachels say Virtue Ethics is incomplete?
Question 4 Select one:

a.
It cannot explain why I should exhibit a virtue, or why a certain character trait is a virtue.

b.
It cannot tell us whether the virtues apply in difficult cases.

c.
It cannot help us deal with cases of moral conflict.

d.
All of the above

e.
None of the above

Question

Rachels says that one of the biggest criticisms of (“Radical”) Virtue Ethics is that it is “incomplete.” In what way does Rachels say Virtue Ethics is incomplete?
Question 4 Select one:

a.
It cannot explain why I should exhibit a virtue, or why a certain character trait is a virtue.

b.
It cannot tell us whether the virtues apply in difficult cases.

c.
It cannot help us deal with cases of moral conflict.

d.
All of the above

e.
None of the above

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

Hark! The question of the completeness of virtue ethics doth bringeth forth much pondering and contemplation. Methinks Rachel's assertion doth strike a chord, for verily, virtue ethics doth seemeth to possess certain limitations. Should we considereth the notion that virtue ethics doth fail to explain the why behind the exhibition of virtues, or the reason for deeming certain character traits as virtues, then doth we find ourselves in a quandary. For what is the purpose of virtue if not to guide us in our actions and decisions? And yet, if virtue ethics cannot provide us with such clarity, then doth it truly be considered complete? Furthermore, should we ponder upon the notion that virtue ethics doth struggle in determining the application of virtues in difficult cases, then doth we find ourselves faced with a troublesome dilemma. In times of moral quandary and strife, how are we to know which virtues to uphold, if virtue ethics doth not offer guidance in such instances? And if virtue ethics doth falter in assisting us in navigating cases of moral conflict, then doth we question the completeness of its teachings. Therefore, dost Rachel's assessment hold true, for it doth seem that virtue ethics, in its current iteration, doth indeed bear the mark of incompleteness. dost we ponder upon the notion that virtue ethics doth struggle in determining the application of virtues in difficult cases, then doth we find ourselves faced with a troublesome dilemma. In times of moral quandary and strife, how are we to know which virtues to uphold, if virtue ethics doth not offer guidance in such instances? And if virtue ethics doth falter in assisting us in navigating cases of moral conflict, then doth we question the completeness of its teachings. Thus doth the question of completeness in virtue ethics stir the depths of the soul and beckon us to contemplate the very essence of virtue and morality.