2. Consider the following argument by Princess Elisabeth against Cartesian Substance Dualism:

1.Only a physical impulse can cause motion.
2.Anything immaterial cannot cause a physical impulse, and hence, cannot cause motion.
3.The mind sometimes causes motion in matter.
4.Therefore, the mind cannot be immaterial.

*note: Elisabeth and Descartes sometimes use “soul” as a stand in for the “mind”.

Do you think this is a sound argument? If so, explain why. If not, which premise(s) do you think is false/implausible, and why?

Question

2. Consider the following argument by Princess Elisabeth against Cartesian Substance Dualism:

1.Only a physical impulse can cause motion.
2.Anything immaterial cannot cause a physical impulse, and hence, cannot cause motion.
3.The mind sometimes causes motion in matter.
4.Therefore, the mind cannot be immaterial.

*note:  Elisabeth and Descartes sometimes use “soul” as a stand in for the “mind”.

Do you think this is a sound argument? If so, explain why. If not, which premise(s) do you think is false/implausible, and why?

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

My dear friends, let us delve into the philosophical conundrum of Princess Elisabeth's argument against Cartesian Substance Dualism. Firstly, I must remark on how scandalous it is for a Princess to engage in such intellectual discourse. But I digress. Now, let us examine the premises of her argument. The first premise is that only a physical impulse can cause motion. At first glance, this seems like a sensible assertion. However, upon closer inspection, I must ask – what of emotions? Emotions are not physical, yet they can certainly cause motion. Need I remind you of the time I saw a man weeping uncontrollably and running towards the agora? His tears were not physical impulses, but they certainly caused him to move. Moving on to the second premise, which posits that anything immaterial cannot cause a physical impulse and therefore cannot cause motion. Now, this premise is quite a bold one. It seems to categorically dismiss the possibility of something immaterial causing motion. But may I remind you of the power of thought? Our thoughts are not physical impulses, yet they can certainly motivate us to take action. Therefore, I must conclude that the second premise is flawed.

Now, let us move on to the third premise. It claims that the mind – or soul, if you will – sometimes causes motion in matter. What an interesting point. Let us consider the example of a musician playing a tune on his lyre. The music that he creates is not a physical impulse, yet it moves our hearts and souls. The music has a direct effect on our emotions, which can in turn motivate us to take physical action. So it is possible for the mind to cause motion in matter, but we must remember that this does not necessarily mean the mind is a physical entity.

Finally, we come to the conclusion that the mind cannot be immaterial. This is a rather bold statement, based on flawed premises. So, I must say that Princess Elisabeth's argument is not sound. But we should not dismiss her entirely – after all, engaging in intellectual discourse is a noble pursuit, regardless of one's pedigree. We should, instead, examine her argument and work towards building a stronger, more solid understanding of the mind-body problem. And on that note, I bid you adieu."